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I. INTRODUCTION
The biotechnology industry “stands out in its creation of high quality jobs, the 
breadth of markets it serves, and its research and development intensity.”1 As of 
2014, the North American biotechnology industry consisted of more than 1,280 
companies with a market worth greater than $200 billion.2 Over 1.4 million jobs are 
directly reliant upon the biotechnology industry within the United States, with those 
jobs having an average salary above the national median.3 In 2012, biotechnology 
companies combined to spend over $9 billion on research and development.4
It is this enormous investment and impact on the United States’ economy that 
makes the biotechnology industry so important, and it must be noted that such 
metrics ignore the improvements in healthcare, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and 
more that stem from biotechnological research.  Unfortunately, this huge investment 
makes the biotechnology industry uniquely dependent on the patent system.5 For 
example, a new pharmaceutical averages ten years and $1.8 billion to bring to the 
market.6 Without the comfort of patent protection at the end of research and 
development, biotechnology companies would be much less willing to spend 
enormous sums of money and amounts of time for a resulting product that may be 
copied and marketed by a competitor at much lower cost.7 Additionally, the lengthy 
research and development often requires funding by venture capitalists who look to 
the resulting patent as a way to recoup the initial investment.8
Despite this need for protection, there has been substantial uncertainty 
surrounding the eligibility of biotechnological inventions in patent law, leading 
many within the industry to doubt “whether meaningful patent protection remains 
                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018; B.S. (Biochemistry), 2014, 
University of Southern Maine.
1. Battelle Memorial Institute et al., State Bioscience Industry Development 2012, 2 (June 2012), 
https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/files/v3battelle-bio_2012_industry_development.pdf.
2. John Raidt, Patents and Biotechnology, 11 (U.S. Chamber of Com. Found., 2014), http:www.us 
chamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/article/foundation/RaidtPaper.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 16.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Ch. 3, p. 1 (2003) 
(“Biotech representatives emphasized that patent protection is critical to attract the capital necessary to 
fund this high-risk investment.”).
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available in the United States for many biotechnology inventions . . . .”9 This 
uncertainty can be traced, in part, to the increasing use of judicially crafted 
exceptions to subject matter eligibility under Section 101 of the Patent Act as an 
additional functional requirement to a patent’s validity. 
These exceptions state that a patent may not be granted for an invention that 
attempts to claim a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.10
However, many years of Supreme Court precedent have led to a muddy 
understanding of when such exceptions apply.  If the improper use of the judicial 
exceptions continues, an alarming number of patents are at threat of being 
invalidated.  This effect is much more pronounced in the biotechnology industry, as 
the basic premise of the biotechnology industry rests upon the use of laws of nature 
and natural phenomena as building blocks.  As a result, almost any patent claimed 
by the biotechnology industry is potentially at risk of being denied or invalidated.
Recently, in Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit pushed back against the improper 
functional use of the judicial exceptions, extending a ray of hope to those in the 
biotechnology industry.11 In Rapid Litigation, the Federal Circuit both clarified the 
applicable Supreme Court precedent, as well as set boundaries on the use of judicial 
exceptions as they relate to laws of nature or natural phenomena.  This Note 
examines that decision, and analyzes why the Federal Circuit made the correct 
decision by returning the judicial exceptions to a more proper narrow scope that is 
in accordance with the statutory text and principles behind the patent system.
This Note begins with a brief overview of the statutory law and the precedent 
regarding subject matter eligibility.  Next, this Note describes the patent at issue, 
followed by the approaches taken by the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois and the Federal Circuit.  Both approaches are then analyzed with 
a discussion of why the Federal Circuit’s approach properly balances both the 
statutory requirements and the principles behind patent law. Finally, this Note briefly 
discusses the fact that the patent at issue in Rapid Litigation claims an eligible subject 
matter does not necessarily make it valid under the other requirements of the Patent 
Act, minimizing the fears espoused in support of the judicial exceptions.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress’s power to issue patents is firmly rooted in the Constitution, which 
states that Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”12 Pursuant to that power, 
Congress passed the Patent Act of 1793, securing exclusive rights to the inventor for 
                                                                                                     
9. Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 
2, Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (2016) (No. 2015-1570). The 
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) is the largest biotechnology trade association, including over 
1,100 members worldwide, many of which are companies involved with research and development. Id. at 
1.
10. See, e.g., Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (“The Court has 
long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception. ‘[L]aws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 
(1981)). 
11. 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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a period of years.13 Since then, the Patent Act has been amended multiple times, 
most recently by the America Invents Act (Leahy-Smith Act) in 2011, but many 
sections have remained largely unchanged since the initial version penned by 
Thomas Jefferson.14
A. Section 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act states that protection may be granted for “any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof . . . subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”15 Courts have broadly construed eligibility holding that “ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement.”16 Nonetheless, patent subject matter eligibility has 
been consistently limited in an important fashion: “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable.17 These judicially-created 
exceptions were founded on the principle that those are “the basic tools of scientific 
. . . work, ”18 and a patent upon them would “risk disproportionately tying up the use 
of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further 
discoveries.”19
At the same time, the Supreme Court has also cautioned against an overbroad 
interpretation of these exceptions, as “all inventions at some level embody, use, 
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”20
To immediately disqualify a patent solely on the basis that it involves a law of nature, 
natural phenomena, or an abstract idea would be to “swallow all of patent law.”21 In 
an attempt to balance these competing principles, the Supreme Court has warned that 
the courts should “tread carefully” while construing these implicit exceptions.22
B. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.
The Supreme Court was recently confronted with the scope of the judicial 
exceptions once again in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc. (“Mayo”).  There, the Court considered a patent claiming a method for 
calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune 
diseases.23 In invalidating the patent under Section 101, the Court found that the 
                                                                                                     
13. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1980).
14. Id. at 308-09.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).  The only change to Section 101 has been the replacement of “art” with 
“process.” See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
16. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09.
17. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 
(1948)).
18. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
19. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); see also Funk 
Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130 (“They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.  He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a 
monopoly of it which the law recognizes.  If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come 
from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”).
20. Id. at 1293.
21. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
22. Id.
23. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
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patent was directed to one of the judicial exceptions, a law of nature.24 The Court 
determined that the patent was nothing more than a claim upon the natural 
relationship between the concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the 
effectiveness of a certain thiopurine drug dosage.25 As a result, the patent lacked 
anything “sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable 
applications of those regularities.”26
From Mayo, a two-step framework has emerged for distinguishing between a 
patent that claims an ineligible concept and patent-eligible inventions that build upon 
one of those concepts.27 This analysis starts with an inquiry into whether the 
challenged patent is “directed to” one of the patent-ineligible concepts.28 If the 
answer is no, then the inquiry is complete, and the invention would satisfy the subject 
matter requirements of Section 101.29 If the answer is yes to the first step, however, 
then the Court must continue on to ask whether there is “an element or combination 
of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”30
In characterizing the patent’s claim, the Court looks for an “inventive concept,” 
considering the elements of the claim both individually and as an ordered 
combination.31 Such an inventive concept “‘transform[s] the nature of the claim’ 
into a patent-eligible application.”32 This transformation requires more than “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific 
community,”33 or an “insignificant post-solution activity.”34 A failure to include this 
inventive concept is deemed an attempt to patent nothing more than the ineligible 
concept itself.35
The Mayo decision has not been free from criticism, however, with some 
viewing it as an overbroad interpretation of the judicial exceptions,36 the very thing 
that the Supreme Court has cautioned against.37 Further, Mayo lacks substantial 
guidance regarding when a patent is “directed to” one of the judicial exceptions, and 
even what is considered a “law of nature” or a “natural phenomenon.”38 This push-
                                                                                                     
24. Id. at 1296.
25. Id. at 1297.
26. Id. at 1298.
27. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
31. Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
32. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
33. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
34. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981).
35. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
36. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 264-66 
(2015) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “expansive approach” to the identification of laws of nature and 
natural phenomenon); Philip Merksamer, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Metastasis of Mayo and 
Myriad and the Evisceration of Patent Eligibility for Molecular Diagnostics, 31 BERKLEY TECH. L. J.
495, 509 (2016) (“The Court’s cavalier use of the ‘law of nature’ exception has thus broadened its scope 
beyond [its] original description. Depending on how lower courts apply Mayo, the ‘law of nature’ 
exception may encompass any relationship that that arises from a natural process . . . .”).
37. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (stating that “too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle 
could eviscerate patent law.”).
38. See id. at 1296-97 (determining the patent is directed to a law of nature without defining “law of 
nature”).
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and-pull over the scope of the judicial exceptions also encompasses a debate about 
whether Section 101 is properly used as a jurisdictional limitation on patents, or a 
functional limitation that should be used to test their validity.39 Under a jurisdictional 
approach, Section 101 provides the “doctrine that maps the boundaries and the patent 
laws,” while under the functional view, Section 101 is used as “a tool for testing the 
validity of the claims of individual patents.”40 These differing approaches to the 
scope of Section 101 can be seen underlying the varying applications of the Mayo
test in the case presented below.
C.  Section 103
Moving beyond Section 101, the Patent Act includes several substantive 
requirements under Sections 102, 103, and 112.  Thus, even if a claim is potentially 
eligible for patent protection under Section 101, the claim must also satisfy the other 
“conditions and requirements of [the Patent Act].”41 Sections 102 and 112 are not 
discussed in this Note, but a brief discussion of obviousness under Section 103 helps 
visualize the implications of the Federal Circuit’s decision.42
Under Section 103, “[a] patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . 
if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the 
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”43 The Supreme 
Court has further expanded upon the statutory text, looking at the “scope and content 
of the prior art,” the “differences between the prior art and the claims,” and “the level 
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”44
In 2007, the Supreme Court revised its obviousness jurisprudence in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., requiring that a patent seeking to improve upon a 
prior process “is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their 
established functions.”45 Such an improvement is considered predictable if “a person 
of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her 
technical grasp.”46 If the improvement “only unites old elements with no change in 
their respective function . . . [and] obviously withdraws what already is known into 
the field of its monopoly,”47 that is a “principal reason”48 for finding the patent 
obvious. 
                                                                                                     
39. See generally David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Patent Law 101: The Threshold Test 
as Threshing Machine, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 135 (2013).
40. Id. at 136.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
42. The District Court noted that there was a challenge to the ‘929 Patent under Section 112, but did 
not decide the issue as it “dispatched the ‘929 Patent under Section 101, and that [was] enough.” Celsis
In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The Federal Circuit did not 
discuss specificity under Section 112 on appeal. See generally Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, 
Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (not discussing specificity within its decision).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2014).
44. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
45. KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
46. Id. at 421.
47. Id. at 416 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53
(1950)).
48. Id. 
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While the decision within KSR encompasses much more, the patent at issue in 
this Note sought to improve upon a process present within the prior art.  Therefore, 
for the purpose of discussing the obviousness of the patent within this Note, this brief 
overview will provide the basic framework for analysis.
III. THE PATENT
Celsis In Vitro, Inc. (“Celsis”) was granted U.S. Patent No. 7,604,929 (“‘929 
Patent”), entitled “Cellular Compositions and Methods for Their Preparation,” on 
October 20, 2009.49 Broadly, the ‘929 Patent recites a claim for an “invention 
concern[ing] methods of processing preparations of such cells so as to permit their 
repeated cryopreservation and thawing while retaining substantial viability.”50
Hepatocytes are a type of liver cell that make up between sixty to eighty percent
of the liver’s mass,51 and are commonly used in biological and biopharmaceutical 
research.  Hepatocytes have a multitude of functions52 that make them especially 
useful for exploring the mechanisms and predicting the results of drug metabolism.53
Hepatocytes have also shown a potential to be used in cell transplantations in order 
to provide liver functions to individuals with liver failure, and in the creation of 
Bioartificial livers.54
All these uses, however, are limited by an insufficient and inconsistent supply 
of hepatocytes.55 Hepatocytes can only be obtained from liver resections, or non-
transplantable, healthy livers.56 Cryopreservation has provided somewhat of an 
answer to this insufficient supply, allowing for the storage of hepatocytes over longer 
periods of time, but the freezing of hepatocytes typically results in a dramatic 
decrease in the number of viable cells recovered following thawing.57 If the 
hepatocytes are nonviable following thawing, there is a loss of cellular function that
makes them essentially useless.  This loss of viability, and the following inability to 
store hepatocytes for later use, is ultimately what led Celsis to the discovery claimed 
by the ‘929 Patent.
While the ‘929 Patent includes a multitude of claims, the first claim is sufficient 
to represent the invention as discussed in this Note.  The first claim sets forth the 
following steps:
                                                                                                     
49. U.S. Patent No. 7, 604, 929 (issued Oct. 20, 2009).
50. Id. at [57].  The ‘929 patent also includes claims that specify the hepatocytes are to be selected 
from various sources and pooled together, and then subjected to the cryopreservation process. Supra note 
26. These claims, however, are dependent on the overlying cryopreservation process, and the District 
Court found it “undisputed that a determination that Claim 1 is invalid dooms all of those dependent 
claims.” Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2015), supplemented 
by 94 F. Supp. 3d 940. 
51. ‘929 Patent at col. 1 ll. 16-17.
52. Hepatocytes play a key role in detoxification, modification, and excretion of substances that 
originate from both within and outside the cell. Id. at col. 1 ll. 17-20. Other functions include protein 
synthesis, protein storage, the transformation of carbohydrates, and the synthesis of cholesterol, bile salts, 
and phospholipids. Id. at col. 1 ll. 25-27.
53. Id. at col. 1 ll. 37-58.
54. Id. at col. 1 ll. 59-63.
55. Id. at col. 2 ll. 22-25.
56. Id. at col. 2 ll. 25-27.
57. Id. at col. 3 ll. 5-8.
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(A) subjecting hepatocytes that have been frozen and thawed to density 
gradient fractionation to separate viable hepatocytes from non-viable 
hepatocytes;
(B) recovering the separated viable hepatocytes; and
(C) cryopreserving the recovered viable hepatocytes to thereby form said 
desired preparation of hepatocytes without requiring a density gradient step 
after thawing the hepatocytes for the second time, wherein the hepatocytes 
are not plated between the first and second cryopreservations, and wherein 
greater than 70% of the hepatocytes of said preparation are viable after the 
final thaw.58
In essence, the ‘929 Patent process takes a pool of hepatocytes that have been 
subjected to the previously known freeze-thaw cycle, and then separates out the 
viable and nonviable cells by utilizing density gradient centrifugation,59 resulting in 
a pool of viable hepatocytes that have demonstrated an ability to withstand the 
cryopreservation process.  That pool of hepatocytes is then cryopreserved once again, 
relying on the discovery that hepatocytes that survive one cryopreservation are more 
likely to be able to withstand a second round of the freeze-thaw cycle.  This process 
is stated to result in a pool of hepatocytes that will exhibit greater than seventy 
percent viability when thawed for the second time, without the use of another 
gradient centrifugation separation.60 Celsis believed this was a significant
improvement over the prior art which allowed hepatocytes to only be frozen once 
before they were required to be used or discarded.61 This process allows for the 
creation of a pool of frozen, but viable, hepatocytes that may be sold for research 
purposes.62
IV. THE CASE
A. A Long History of Litigation
Since its grant, the ‘929 Patent has been the subject of a long court battle over 
the patent’s validity and the possibility of infringement.  Celsis originally filed an 
action for patent infringement against CellzDirect, Inc. and Invitrogen Corp. 
(collectively “LTC”)63 in June 2010.64 Following the initial filing, both Celsis and 
LTC filed multiple motions, resulting in litigation spanning more than five years.  
                                                                                                     
58. Id. at col. 19 ll. 62-64, col. 20 ll. 12-19.
59. Density gradient centrifugation separates out cells on the basis of their density. Here, the ‘929 
Patent employs Percoll density gradient centrifugation, a process which was first published in 1978.  See 
Hakan Pertoft et al., Density Gradients Prepared from Colloidal Silica Particles Coated By 
Polyvinylpyrrolidone (Percoll), 88 ANALYTICAL BIOCHEMISTRY, at 271 (1978).
60. ‘929 Patent at col. 2 ll. 13-20.
61. Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 777-78 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
62. Id. at 778.
63. CellzDirect, Inc. and Invitrogen Corporation were named defendants in the original suit brought 
by Celsis In Vitro, Inc. CellzDirect and Invitrogen merged with a third corporation to create Life 
Technologies Corporation (LTC), as they are referred to by both the District Court and the Federal Circuit. 
Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
64. Celsis In Vitro Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d at 780.
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But within that period, neither the District Court, nor the Federal Circuit, definitively 
ruled on the validity of the ‘929 Patent.65 Finally, in March 2015, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois provided such a ruling.66
B. The District Court’s Opinion
In the pendency of the litigation over the ‘929 Patent, the Supreme Court decided 
both Mayo and Alice, ultimately providing the District Court with “the roadmap” for 
determining the validity of the ‘929 Patent.67 Utilizing the Mayo test, the District 
Court invalidated the ‘929 Patent on the grounds that “[d]iscovery of a natural law 
simply does not qualify as patentable subject matter; nor does any other part of the 
‘929 [P]atent’s claims display the requisite inventiveness to satisfy § 101.”68
Following the first step of the Mayo test, the District Court looked to determine 
whether the ‘929 Patent was directed to one of the patent ineligible concepts, a law 
of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.69 The District Court based its 
approach to the first step of the Mayo test on the USPTO’s 2014 Interim Eligibility 
Guidance, which provided that a claim is “directed to a judicial exception when a 
law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea is recited (i.e., set forth or 
described) in the claim.”70 Using this, the District Court was quick to characterize 
the ability of hepatocytes to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles as a recited law of 
nature.71 That determination was deemed sufficient to conclude that the ‘929 Patent 
was directed to one of the patent ineligible concepts, satisfying step one of the Mayo
test.72
In searching for the “requisite inventive concept” under step two, the District 
Court was seemingly unimpressed with the simplicity of the repetition utilized by 
the ‘929 Patent, determining that it was a “straightforward application of the truth 
that hepatocytes are inherently capable of surviving multiple freeze-thaw cycles.”73
Celsis argued that as the prior art of cryopreserving “taught away from multiple 
freezings,” the repetition of the cryopreservation process must be considered 
inventive.74 Relegated to a footnote by the District Court, Celsis supported this 
contention with a Western District of Wisconsin ruling stating that “if inventors 
engage in activities that run counter to scientific thought, those activities can hardly 
be considered conventional under § 101.”75 The Illinois District Court in Celsis
properly noted that such a case carries no precedential value, but then moved to 
distinguish the Wisconsin case by stating that the patent at issue “creatively 
marshaled techniques that no scientist would have thought to apply to the particular 
field at the time.”76 In contrast, the District Court believed that the “‘929 Patent 
                                                                                                     
65. Id. at 780-81.
66. See generally id. at 774.
67. Id. at 781 n.4.
68. Id. at 786.
69. Id. at 783.
70. 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,622 (Dec. 16, 2014)). 
71. Celsis In Vitro Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 784.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 784 n.7 (quoting Ameritox, Ltd. v. Milennium Health, L.L.C., 88 F. Supp. 3d 885, 907 
(W.D. Wis. 2015)) (emphasis omitted).
76. Id.
298 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2
directly follow[ed] from the discovery of a law of nature . . . and the patent directs 
the employment of methods that were routinely used in the prior art for precisely the 
same purpose . . . .”77
Following its failed search for an inventive concept, the District Court held that 
the ‘929 Patent recited a claim for nothing more than “the natural fact that, in a 
normal population of hepatocytes . . . some sub-population is capable of surviving 
the process of being frozen and thawed at least two times.”78 The discovery of the 
fact is then followed by a process that applies “only well-understood, routine, and 
conventional cell separation and cryopreservation steps admittedly in common use 
long before the time of the claimed inventions.”79 As a consequence, the District 
Court invalidated the ‘929 Patent as ineligible subject matter under Section 101.80
By disposing of the claim under the Mayo test, the District Court 
mentioned, but did not analyze, the patent under the machine-or-
transformation test,81 a commonly used test to help determine subject 
matter eligibility.  The machine-or-transformation test looks to the 
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ 
[as] the clue to the patentability” of an invention.82  That test is considered 
an “important and useful clue,” but the Supreme Court has “neither said 
nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.”83  
The District Court also noted that it was careful in its opinion not to confuse the 
requisite inventive concept under step two of the Mayo test with the novel and 
nonobviousness requirements under Sections 102 and 103.84 In an additional brief 
note, the District Court recognized that the ‘929 Patent was “somewhat unique,” in 
that despite the lack of inventive concept, the patent was more narrowly drawn than 
the patent at issue in Mayo, as it did not “lock up the natural law in its entirety.”85
However, the District Court believed that LTC’s ability to “engineer around the 
patent” was not sufficient to overcome preemption concerns, as the ability to patent 
even a narrow set of routine steps would allow claims for other narrow, routine 
combinations of steps, eventually resulting in the patenting of the natural law in its 
entirety.86
C.  Appeal to the Federal Circuit
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the case in a unanimous 
opinion, holding that the ‘929 Patent was simply not directed to a law of nature.87 At 
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step one, the Federal Circuit looked beyond the recitation or description of a law of 
nature. Instead, the Federal Circuit looked to the essence of the patent as a whole to 
determine that the ‘929 Patent was “directed to a new and useful method of 
preserving hepatocytes.”88 In coming to this result, the Federal Circuit distinguished 
multiple cases in which it, and the Supreme Court, had determined that patents were 
directed to an ineligible judicial exception.89
One such case, Ariosa Diagnotics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., claimed a method for 
detecting “paternally inherited cffDNA [cell-free fetal DNA]” in the blood or serum 
of pregnant women.90 There, the Federal Circuit invalided the patent as claiming a 
natural phenomenon: the existence and location of the cffDNA.91 At step two, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the Ariosa claim was directed to the existence of 
cffDNA, an ineligible concept under the judicial exceptions.92 The Federal Circuit 
determined that that was instantly distinguishable from the present case, as the “end 
result of the ‘929 patent claim[] is not simply an observation or detection . . . [r]ather, 
the claims [were] directed to a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving 
hepatocyte cells.”93
LTC put forth an argument that a focus on the patent’s claimed application of 
the hepatocytes’ ability to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles would be an improper 
“shoehorn[ing]” of the step two analysis into the first step.94 Instead, LTC argued 
that the first step of the Mayo test solely focuses upon whether the patent claims a 
natural law or phenomenon, ignoring the actual application of that claim.95 The 
Federal Circuit summarily rejected this argument, stating that LTC’s approach would 
“‘eviscerate patent law’”96 by precluding the patenting of any invention that “touches 
on something natural.”97
While the determination that the ‘929 Patent was not directed towards an 
ineligible concept at step one was sufficient to dispose of LTC’s claims, in dicta, the 
Federal Circuit continued to analyze the ‘929 Patent under step two of the Mayo
test.98 Again disagreeing with the District Court, the Federal Circuit determined that 
the ‘929 Patent would still be valid under step two.99 In particular, the Federal Circuit 
looked to the Supreme Court’s statement that claims “‘directed to’ a patent-ineligible 
concept, yet also ‘improv[ing] an existing technological process,’ are sufficient to 
‘transform[] the process into an inventive application’ of the patent-ineligible 
concept.”100 The Federal Circuit was not swayed by LTC’s attempted argument that 
all of the steps involved in the ‘929 Patent were previously known and well-
understood.  While the Federal Circuit did acknowledge that both the individual steps 
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of the freeze-thaw cycle, and the ordered combination of one freeze-thaw cycle, were 
routine and conventional, the repetition of the entire cryopreservation process for a 
second time was sufficiently inventive.101
Returning to Ariosa, the Federal Circuit once again distinguished between the 
two patents, stating that because the Ariosa patent used “steps of preparing, 
amplifying, and detecting genetic sequences [that] were already being done,” the 
only difference was the steps being completed on the newly discovered cffDNA.102
The ‘929 Patent, on the other hand, included a new process, even if the individual 
steps and ordered combination were previously known.103 In particular, the Federal 
Circuit looked to prior art having taught away from multiple freezings, and utilizing 
methods with only one freeze-thaw cycle.104 From this, the Federal Circuit found 
that the inventors of the ‘929 Patent discovered that some hepatocytes are able to 
survive multiple rounds of cryopreservation, and then applied a new and improved 
method for preserving those hepatocytes.105 The Federal Circuit cautioned that to 
require any more from an inventor would be to “discount the human ingenuity that 
comes from applying a natural discovery in a way that achieves a ‘new and useful 
end.’”106
The Federal Circuit ended its opinion on two final notes.  First, the Federal 
Circuit addressed the ease of execution or obviousness of application, noting—as did 
the District Court—that those principles are examined under separate provisions of 
the Patent Act and beyond the scope of Section 101.107 Second, the Federal Circuit 
made it clear that preemption “is not the test for determining patent-eligibility,” but 
accepted the District Court’s findings that the ‘929 Patent does not lock up the natural 
law in entirety as evidenced by LTC’s ability to engineer around the patent.108
D.  Looking to the Supreme Court
In illustrating the difference between an invalid patent directed towards a law of 
nature and the ‘929 Patent, the Federal Circuit used its prior decision in Ariosa v. 
Sequenom.109 That case is of particular interest due to the differing opinions of the 
judges expressed in the denial of a rehearing en banc.
In a concurring opinion to the denial, Judge Lourie, joined by Judge Moore, 
expressed disappointment with the outcome of the case, but believed that under 
current Supreme Court precedent they were bound to such a result.110 In a separate 
concurring opinion, Judge Dyk stated a belief that the Mayo test was too restrictive, 
but also believed that the Federal Circuit was “bound by the language of Mayo, and 
any further guidance must come from the Supreme Court, not [the Federal 
Circuit].”111 A final dissenting opinion by Judge Newman took a more narrow 
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approach to the Mayo test, believing that the “[p]recedent does not require that all 
discoveries of natural phenomena or their application in new ways or for new uses 
are ineligible for patenting; the [Supreme] Court has cautioned against such 
generalizations.”112
These conflicting opinions help exemplify the internal unrest within the Federal 
Circuit regarding the application of the Mayo test and the scope of the judicial 
exceptions. This underscores the guidance needed not only by the District Courts 
and Federal Circuit, but also those who would seek to patent an invention resting 
upon a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.  
On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Ariosa, leaving the 
Federal Circuit’s plea for guidance unanswered.113
V. ANALYSIS
This case presented differing conclusions to the Mayo test at both steps, as well 
as the scope of Section 101.  The following analysis is broken down into the steps of 
the Mayo test, including a discussion of why the Federal Circuit’s approach better 
exemplifies the principles and scope of the judicial exceptions, and a final word on 
the potential validity of the ‘929 Patent under Section 103.
A. “Directed to”
The first step of the Mayo test requires a court to determine whether the patent 
is directed towards one of the patent ineligible concepts, a law of nature, natural 
phenomenon, or abstract idea.114 The District Court’s approach to this step solely 
asked whether there was a judicial exception recited or described within the patent 
claim.  As soon as that determination was made, it was considered sufficient to move 
to step two’s search for an inventive concept.  The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, 
looked to the essence of the patent as a whole to determine what it was that the 
inventors were seeking to protect.  The Federal Circuit showed more of a concern 
with what the inventors were seeking to “tie up” with the grant of the patent, rather 
than the bare wording of the patent. Of the two, the Federal Circuit’s “essence of the 
patent” approach stays the most faithful to the principles leading to the creation of 
the judicial exceptions in the first place.
The judicial exceptions were created to prevent the improper monopolization of 
the “basic tools of scientific and technological work.”115 If the patent doesn’t seek 
to do just that—or actually do that—then the principles guiding the exceptions are 
moot as applied to that patent.  This is not to say that the District Court was incorrect 
in asserting that the patent recites or describes one of the judicial exceptions—
regardless of the dubious labelling as a “law of nature”—but the Supreme Court has 
cautioned against “mak[ing] the determination of patentable subject matter depend 
simply on the draftsman’s art . . . .”116 Such a bare analysis does not serve the 
principles behind the judicial exceptions, and encourages strategic drafting of patent 
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applications to simply avoid stating a natural law or phenomenon.  The first step of 
the Mayo test doesn’t ask whether the patent includes or rests at some level upon a 
judicial exception—it asks whether the patent is directed to that exception.  It is true 
that the ‘929 Patent does, at some level, rest upon the hepatocytes’ natural 
characteristics, but the essence of the patent as a whole is not that ability. It is a 
discreet process used to preserve those hepatocytes which are capable of surviving 
multiple rounds of cryopreservation.  The underlying natural ability of the 
hepatocytes is necessary for the method to operate, but it is in no way the essence of 
the patent, nor is that what the inventors sought to protect.
Inventions within the biotechnology industry will almost invariably will rest 
upon some law of nature or natural phenomenon.  That is the fundamental basis of 
biotechnology: taking the natural world, understanding it, and manipulating it.  
Patents exist to encourage that innovation through the grant of an exclusive right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention.  The judicial exceptions 
were created to prevent the “monopolization of [the laws of nature, natural 
phenomenon, and abstract ideas] through the grant of a patent [that] might tend to 
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”117 However, an overbroad 
application of those same exceptions would cause the same barrier to innovation that 
the exceptions were created to prevent, and the Supreme Court has consistently 
cautioned as such.118 Step one of the Mayo test should be the selective gatekeeper to 
the judicial exceptions, weeding out those patents that truly do attempt to claim an 
impermissible building block from those that merely “embody, use, reflect, rest 
upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,”119 but the 
District Court’s approach would turn it into a waterfall.  Such an approach would 
lead to a high volume of patents being tested for “sufficient inventiveness” under 
Section 101 and the Mayo test, a section that is only supposed to set forth the 
boundaries for patent eligibility.  If the ‘929 Patent is not deserving of protection 
because it lacks an improvement over the prior art, or because it is too simple, such 
a determination is properly the domain of an obviousness determination under 
Section 103, not a subject matter eligibility analysis under Section 101.
The Federal Circuit provided guidance on step one of the Mayo test in a way 
that stays true to the fundamental principles underlying the judicial exceptions, but 
also allows for an application with teeth when necessary.  In sum, the Federal Circuit 
was apt in stating: “‘an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because 
it involves’ one of the patent-ineligible concepts . . . to preclude the patenting of an
invention simply because it touches on something natural would ‘eviscerate patent 
law.’”120 Under the Federal Circuit’s precedent set here, this should be prevented 
from happening.
B. Searching for an Inventive Concept
The analysis of the second step of the Mayo test must start with a caveat.  As the 
‘929 Patent was properly determined to not be directed towards a law of nature under 
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step one of the Mayo test, the Federal Circuit’s approach to step two of the Mayo test 
came as dicta.  While this portion of the opinion is not precedential, the following 
uses the Federal Circuit’s reasoning regarding the ‘929 Patent to demonstrate why 
this approach should continue to be applied.
Under the second step of the Mayo test, the reviewing court must look to whether
a patent that has properly been determined to be directed to one of the judicial 
exceptions includes a sufficient “inventive concept.”  This ensures that the patent is 
more than a claim for the ineligible concept itself.  In order to be considered an 
inventive concept, the patent must claim more than a “well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community.”121 Instead, 
the invention must be “sufficient to ‘transform[ ] the process into an inventive 
application’ of the patent-ineligible concept.”122
The District Court believed the “patented process lack[ed] the requisite 
inventive concept.”123 The repetition of the known steps of the cryopreservation 
process was not considered sufficiently inventive by the District Court to overcome 
what it believed as the bare truth that the ‘929 Patent was really an attempt to patent 
the hepatocytes’ underlying natural ability.124 In contrast, the Federal Circuit saw 
Celsis’s new technique as a process that improved the prior art.125 The Federal 
Circuit was quick to accept that both the individual steps and the ordered 
combination of steps were already known, but deemed that the second repetition was 
“far from routine and conventional.”126
While it is true that the ability of certain hepatocytes to survive the second 
freeze-thaw cycle is a natural characteristic that should be beyond the scope of any 
patent, it is also important to recognize that the ‘929 Patent does not stake a claim to 
that ability.  Once again, the principle behind the creation of the judicial exceptions 
is relevant—that no patent improperly tie up the “building blocks of human 
ingenuity.”127 The District Court’s approach did not focus on that principle; instead, 
the District Court focused on a perceived simplicity of the method and the 
obviousness of the steps taken.  By doing so, the District Court was asking for more 
than should be required under Section 101. 
Section 101 states that a patent may be granted for any “new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof . . . subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”128 Nowhere 
within that statutory language are any references to the simplicity of an invention or 
the obviousness to a person skilled in the art.  As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he 
obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented must precede 
the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.”129 Thus, a 
question of novelty “is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of 
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”130 In 
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the same vein, neither is a question of obviousness relevant to the subject matter 
analysis.131
The second step of the Mayo test asks only whether “the elements of each claim 
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” are sufficient to “‘transform the 
nature of the claim’ into a patent eligible application.”132 This does not ask for a 
determination of whether that transformation would be obvious to someone within 
the scientific community should they have been the one to discover the underlying 
natural principle, nor does it ask if the invention is novel.  Such an analysis is 
properly performed under the other “conditions and requirements of” the Patent 
Act—Sections 102, 103, and 112.133 The Federal Circuit toed that line very 
carefully, but ultimately stayed within the ambit of Section 101.  Such an approach, 
even if seemingly unnecessarily formalistic, should wisely be carried forward.
C.  Freeze, Thaw, Repeat
As alluded to above, just because the ‘929 Patent is eligible subject matter under 
Section 101 does not mean that the patent is necessarily valid.  In fact, the ‘929 Patent 
should be tested for obviousness under Section 103.  While an in-depth discussion 
of the obviousness standard is beyond the scope of this Note, it is briefly touched 
upon here because it aids in exemplifying that just because a patent is eligible under 
Section 101, this does not mean that the patent is valid, and that the Patent Act 
provides for such situations.
The obviousness of the ‘929 Patent was actually addressed by the Federal Circuit 
in an affirmation of a preliminary injunction determining that Celsis had a likelihood 
of success on the merits in regards to an obviousness challenge to the ‘929 Patent.134
However, there was never a definitive ruling on the merits of the ‘929 Patent under 
Section 103.  Instead, the main legal challenge ended up being focused on Section 
101.  Further, both the District Court and the Federal Circuit, in their respective 
opinions, stated that they were careful not to tread on the requirements of Sections 
102 and 103.135
Dissenting to the Federal Circuit’s affirmation of the preliminary injunction, 
Judge Gajarsa stated that proof of “obviousness does not require that each element 
of the claimed invention must be present in the prior art,” but even if such a standard 
was required, every element was present.136 According to Judge Gajarsa, the 
invention can be broken down into three steps: “(1) thawing cryopreserved 
hepatocytes; (2) using density gradient fractionation to separate viable and non-
viable cells; and (3) refreezing and rethawing the hepatocytes.”137 Each of those 
steps were known previously to an ordinary person skilled in the art—Celsis’s own 
expert testified as such.138 In analyzing the effect of such testimony, it must be noted 
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that the Federal Circuit itself has stated that a simple repetition of known steps “until 
success is achieved” can support a finding of obviousness.139
Even more, the Supreme Court has remarked that an “obviousness analysis 
cannot be confined by . . . overemphasis on the importance of published articles and 
the explicit content of issued patents.”140 Instead, “a court can take account of the 
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
employ.”141 A person skilled in cryopreservation, would be able, upon realizing that 
a subset of hepatocytes can survive multiple rounds of cryopreservation, to complete 
a simple repetition of routine, well-understood steps.  Such an invention is a “product 
not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense,”142 and should have been 
properly determined to be obvious under Section 103 despite its eligibility under 
Section 101.  If the repetition of steps was to be deemed obvious, all that would 
remain is the discovery that a certain subset of hepatocytes can survive multiple 
rounds of cryopreservation.  On its own, that discovery would be insufficient to 
support a patent, and could properly be denied as directed towards a law of nature or 
natural phenomenon.
That fact notwithstanding, the ‘929 Patent was not faced with such a challenge, 
and this is now a moot point.  However, an acknowledgement that the ‘929 Patent 
may have been invalid under Section 103 helps affirm that a limited application of 
Section 101’s subject matter eligibility requirement does not necessarily mean that a 
flood of simplistic patents—tying up all of nature—will result.  Instead, this limited 
application would require courts to confine the analysis of patents to the proper 
section of the Patent Act, providing clarity in what is required for a valid patent to 
be granted in the biotechnology industry. 
VI. CONCLUSION
With this opinion, the Federal Circuit has properly limited the application of the 
Mayo test.  This limited use of the judicial exceptions underlines that “[t]he rule that 
the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests . . . on the [] fundamental 
understanding that they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the [Patent Act] was 
enacted to protect.”143 Continued application of the Federal Circuit’s new guidance 
will lead to a much lower likelihood that patents in the biotechnology industry will 
be improperly invalidated under Section 101.
Moving forward, this should result in courts being much more hesitant to 
quickly “discount the human ingenuity that comes from applying a natural 
discovery”144 by declaring it ineligible under Section 101.  This approach should give 
those within the biotechnology industry renewed hope that the Federal Circuit has 
begun questioning the use of Section 101 as a functional barrier to patentability, and 
has instead properly limited it to outlining the jurisdictional limits of what is eligible 
for patent protection.  But this should not be expanded to say that a patent that 
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survives the Mayo test is necessarily valid.  Instead, challenges to patents that claim 
eligible subject matter will be properly confined to other sections of the Patent Act.
This opinion also signals that the Federal Circuit has become skeptical of 
imprudently labelling something a “law of nature.”145 Perhaps, in the not-too-distant 
future, the Federal Circuit will take on defining the term, limiting its use in the legal 
system in a manner consistent with its use in the sciences.  Finally, while this opinion 
has not alleviated concerns within the biotechnology industry regarding patent 
protection for diagnostic claims, it exemplifies that the Federal Circuit is willing to 
push back the scope and application of the judicial exceptions.  Perhaps further 
refinement will lead to diagnostic claims being eligible once again.
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